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Abstract 
We assess redistribution in the Uruguayan main pension and unemployment insurance 
programs on a lifetime basis. Using administrative records from social security, we 
simulate lifetime declared labor income and flows of contributions and benefits of affiliates 
to the programs. Expected present values of income and net flows are also computed. 
Equipped with these estimations we construct standard measures of distribution and 
redistribution of lifetime labor income through the social security system. Our findings 
suggest that these programs reduce income inequality. In particular, social Security reduces 
the Gini coefficient of expected lifetime formal labor income by almost 2 percentage 
points. 
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 Resumen 
Evaluamos la redistribución en los principales programas de pensión y seguro de 
desempleo en el Uruguay, mirando al individuo a lo largo de la vida. Usando registros 
administrativos de la seguridad social, simulamos el ingreso por trabajo declarado a lo 
largo de la vida y los flujos de contribuciones y beneficios de los afiliados a los programas. 
Los valores presentes esperados del ingreso y los flujos netos también se computan. Con 
estas estimaciones construimos medidas de estándar de distribución y redistribución del 
ingreso laboral a lo largo de la vida a través del sistema de seguridad social. Nuestros 
resultados sugieren que estos programas reducen la desigualdad del ingreso. En particular, 
la seguridad social reduce el índice de Gini del ingreso laboral formal esperado a lo largo 
de la vida por casi 2 puntos porcentuales.  
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1  Introduction 
 
We assess redistribution in the Uruguayan main pension and unemployment insurance 
programs on a lifetime basis. Using administrative records from social security, we 
simulate lifetime declared labor income and flows of contributions and benefits of 
affiliates to the programs and compute the expected present values of income and net 
flows. Equipped with these estimations we compute standard measures of distribution 
and redistribution of lifetime formal labor income through the social security system. 
We find that these programs reduce income inequality. Social Security reduces the Gini 
coefficient of expected lifetime formal labor income by 1.8 percentage points. 
This study is part of a regional project designed to assess redistribution of income in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay.
3 We use a similar methodology in the 
five countries in order to facilitate comparisons. This group of countries includes very 
different designs, ranging from the Chilean and Mexican savings accounts programs to 
the Argentinean and Brazilian PAYG programs, with Uruguay in the middle with its 
mixed program that incorporates both savings accounts and PAYG-DB pensions.  
The Uruguayan social security program, as well as the other programs included in this 
regional project, incorporates explicit redistributive components. There is however 
some concern about the functioning of these programs in the context of high informality 
and frequent interruptions in the histories of contribution to social security. Forteza et 
al. (2009) and Bucheli et al. (2010) show that many contributors to the Uruguayan 
program may not be able to accumulate the thirty years of contributions that are 
currently required to access an ordinary pension. Moreover, Forteza and Ourens (2011) 
warn about the low rates of return that individuals with short histories of contribution 
may get from social security. Therefore, there is a risk that the program is less 
progressive in practice than it was initially thought and designed to be. The present 
study is an attempt to shed some light on this issue. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the conceptual framework that 
guided this study and the whole regional project. We present a brief description of the 
                                                            
3 The other country case studies are presented in Fajnzylber (2011), Moncarz (2011) and Zylberstajn 
(2011). Forteza (2011) presents a summary of the five country cases. 2 
 
Uruguayan old age pension and unemployment insurance programs analyzed in this 
study in section three. Section four describes the data and section five presents the 
methodology. The results are presented in section six. The paper concludes in section 
seven with some final remarks. 
2  Conceptual framework
4 
 
Social Security programs are usually designed to redistribute income from the better to 
the worse off. Most benefit formulas include explicit redistributive ingredients, like 
minimum pensions and supplements to small pensions. Even individual accounts DC 
programs, which are based on the principle of actuarial neutrality, tend to incorporate 
non-actuarial redistributive ingredients. 
But social security programs also redistribute income through less explicit mechanisms. 
First, high mortality rates may reduce the returns low income workers get for their 
contributions in pension programs when unified mortality tables are used (Garrett, 
1995; Duggan et al. 1995; Beach and Davis 1998; Brown et al. 2009).
5  
Second, government transfers that contribute to finance social security in many 
countries favor the population that is covered by the programs, which in developing 
countries tends to be the better off (Rofman et al. 2008). But also these same groups are 
the ones that pay more taxes, so the net effect is not clear (Forteza and Rossi, 2009). 
Ideally, we should trace the origin of the funds governments spend financing social 
security and include those taxes in the individuals’ cash flows.   
Third, low densities of contribution may leave many workers ineligible for benefits. 
Low income workers have been shown to have particularly low densities of contribution 
(Forteza et al. 2009; Berstein et al. 2006).  
In this research project, we focus on this last channel, i.e. the redistribution stemming 
from the fact that low income workers tend to have systematically shorter contribution 
                                                            
4 This section is taken from Forteza (2010). 
5 There is however contradicting evidence on the impact of differential mortality rates on social security 
progressiveness. Brown et al. (2009), for example, report very small effects on the measured progressivity 
of the US Social Security program of incorporating differential mortality rates by race and education.   3 
 
histories. We do not assess the impact of different mortality rates and different coverage 
on implicit redistribution. 
Social Security redistribution is often assessed on an annual basis, analyzing taxes paid 
and benefits received by different groups of contributors. This type of analysis tends to 
show large transfers among groups which depend mostly on the ratio of beneficiaries to 
earners within each group. But most individuals transit from earning income and paying 
contributions to receiving pension benefits along their lifecycle. Therefore, 
redistribution performed through social security can be better assessed adopting a 
lifetime perspective (Liebman, 2001).  
We run micro-simulations of lifetime declared income and social security contributions 
and benefits to assess redistribution. We focus on intra-generational redistribution: one 
cohort, current pension rules. It is worth noticing though that social security performs 
inter- as well as intra-generational redistribution and that there is considerable evidence 
that inter-generational redistribution has been substantial, with early generations usually 
benefiting with high returns to contributions (Liebman 2001, Morató and Musto, 2010). 
The indicator used in this study to analyze transfers is the social security wealth, defined 
as the net present value of the expected lifetime flows of contributions and benefits 
(Gruber and Wise, 1999, 2004; Coile and Gruber, 2001; Liebman, 2001, Brown et al. 
2009). The progressivity of the system is assessed comparing the distribution of the 
expected pre- and post-social security lifetime income. Pre-social security lifetime 
formal labor income is the present value of formal income before contributions to social 
security and without benefits from social security. Post-social security formal income is 
the present value of lifetime formal income net of contributions to social security and 
including benefits from social security. The comparison is done with standard Lorenz 
and concentration curves, Gini indexes and an index of net redistributive effect. 
We consider the individual as the unit of analysis, but it should be noticed that 
redistribution in the social security system may look very different at the family level. 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) show that, when analyzed at the individual level, the 
U.S. social security looks very redistributive, favoring low income workers, but it looks 
much less so at the family level (see also Lambert 1993, p 14). In the words of Brown et 
al. (2009): “…much of the apparent redistribution from Social Security occurs within, 
rather than between, households.” 4 
 
Ideally, the assessment of the redistributive impact of social security programs should 
be based on the comparison of income distribution with and without social security.
6 
This is not the same as comparing pre- and post-social security income (i.e. income 
minus contributions plus benefits), because social security is likely to induce changes in 
work hours, savings, wages and interest rates. In this line, Huggett and Ventura (2000) 
simulate a fully fledged OLG model of Social Security calibrated with US data. Forteza 
(2007) follows a similar approach to study the redistributive impact of a social security 
reform in Uruguay. In a similar vein, albeit not to study redistribution, Jiménez and 
Sánchez (2007) estimate a structural life cycle model to assess the incentives to retire in 
the Spanish Social Security System. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) represents a key 
reference in this line of inquiry. One possible drawback of these models is the 
assumption of full rationality, something that has been subject to much controversy, 
especially regarding long run decisions like those involved in social security. After all, 
the most used rationale for pension programs is individuals’ myopia (Diamond, 2005, 
chap. 4). In principle, a model with hyperbolic preferences could do the job, but solving 
and calibrating these models is even more difficult than the already demanding standard 
optimization in full rationality models. 
In turn, much of fiscal incidence analysis is done on the non-behavioral type of 
assumption. It is usually performed under the assumption that pre-tax income is not 
affected by the tax system. Because of this, it is often interpreted as an analysis of the 
impact effect of the fiscal system (Lambert, 1993, pp 153, 162, chap 11). One such 
example is Euromod. Sutherland (2001) warns: “EUROMOD is better-suited to 
analysing some types of policy and policy change than others. Since it is a static model, 
designed to calculate the immediate, “morning after” effect of policy changes, it neither 
incorporates the effects of behavioural changes (i.e. behaviour does not change) nor the 
long-term effect of change. Thus it is not the appropriate tool for examining policy that 
is only designed to change behaviour, nor for policy that can only have its impact in the 
long term (e.g. some forms of pensions policy). It is best-suited to the analysis of 
                                                            
6 This is the equivalent to what Lambert (1993, p 266) suggests for the assessment of the impact of 
income taxes: “…the impact of an income tax can now be judged by comparing the “with-tax” income 
distribution with the distribution that would pertain in the tax’s absence –the “no-tax” distribution rather 
than the “pre-tax” distribution.” It is interesting to notice though, that ten of the eleven chapters of his 
classical book on distribution and redistribution of income are based on the assumption of invariant pre-
tax income distribution. 5 
 
policies that have an immediate effect and which depend only on current income and 
circumstances.” We will be using life cycle models that are better suited to analyzing 
the redistributive impact of social security policies than the typical static short run 
models used in most microsimulations. However, following standard practice in 
microsimulations, we will not model behavioral responses. Our approach is closer to the 
literature pioneered by Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004), who designed and computed a 
series of indicators of social security incentives to retire assuming no explicit behavioral 
responses. Our study is also close to Liebman (2001) and Brown et al. (2009) who 
simulate lifetime income and compute redistribution in US Social Security using non-
behavioral models. 
In our view, these two approaches are largely complementary. The optimization models 
have the obvious advantage of incorporating behavioral responses, so not only the direct 
effects of policies are considered, but also the indirect effects that go through behavioral 
changes. However, in order to keep things manageable, these theoretically ambitious 
models necessarily make highly stylized assumptions regarding not only individual 
preferences and constraints, but also social security programs. Given our goals, this is a 
serious drawback. We want to assess the lifetime implicit transfers in social security 
given the observed histories of contribution in Latin American countries. We are only 
beginning to characterize the very heterogeneous and highly-fragmented histories of 
contribution which are present in the region (Forteza et al. 2009) and quite far from 
having optimization models that can fit these patterns. Whether these histories of 
contribution are optimal responses to social security rules and various shocks is 
something we cannot answer yet. But given social security rules, it is quite clear that 
these patterns of contribution seriously condition effective net transfers to social 
security. Non-behavioral micro-simulations are based on exogenously given work 
histories and geared to providing insights on the social security transfers that emerge 
from those histories. Thanks to their relative simplicity, non behavioral models allow 
for a much more detailed specification of the policy rules and work histories than 
intertemporal optimization models. An additional advantage of micro-simulations is that 
the effects are straightforward, so no black-box issues arise. At the very least, we can 
expect to capture the first-order impact effects of social security on income distribution. 6 
 
The micro-simulation modeling can thus be seen as a first step in a more ambitious 
research program that incorporates behavioral responses in a more advanced phase.
7 
3  The Uruguayan pension and unemployment insurance programs 
 
The Uruguayan old-age pension system is composed of five separate programs. The 
largest one is mixed, with a first PAYG-DB and a second individual savings accounts 
pillar. A public institution, the Banco de Previsión Social (BPS), collects contributions 
and administers the first pillar. Four private administrators, the Administradoras de 
Fondos de Ahorro Previsional (AFAP) manage the savings accounts. By 2001, this 
program covered about 90 percent of the total number of contributors to all social 
security institutions in the country (Ferreira-Coimbra and Forteza, 2004).  The other 
four programs have more limited scope and cover specific groups of workers: bank 
employees, notaries, self-employed university graduates, armed forces personnel, and 
police force personnel. In this paper, we focus exclusively on the program administered 
by BPS-AFAP. 
The mixed BPS-AFAP program was inaugurated in 1996, and is the result of reforms to 
the old PAYG-DB program, administered by the BPS. The old-age, survivors, disability 
and unemployment insurance programs served by BPS are financed with employee and 
employer contributions plus revenues from some ear-marked taxes. The government 
also contributes to the financing of this program covering deficits. Employer 
contributions are currently 7.5 percent and employee contributions are 15 percent of 
covered wages, but only part of employee contributions are allocated to the PAYG-DB 
pillar administered by the BPS. Depending on the wage level and options left to 
individuals
8, up to approximately half of employee contributions are deposited in 
savings accounts. Wages are covered up to a maximum that is monthly adjusted 
according to the average wage index (this maximum is currently equivalent to about 
                                                            
7 An example of this strategy is the retirement research line followed by Jiménez and collaborators in the 
case of Spain (Boldrin et al. 1999, 2004; Jiménez and Sánchez, 2007).  
8 Individuals with low wages (less than about 1,265 dollars per month) are in principle served exclusively 
by the first pillar, unless they explicitly opt to participate also in the savings account pillar. No one is 
served exclusively by the individual savings accounts pillar. 7 
 
3,800 dollars per month). A peculiarity of the Uruguayan social security system is that 
OASDI and unemployment insurance programs have a totally unified financing.  
The old-age pension program provides two pensions, one served by the PAYG-DB 
pillar and the other by the savings accounts pillar. Eligibility in the PAYG pillar 
includes a minimum of 60 years of age and 30 years of contributions. At 65 years of 
age, individuals can claim the PAYG pension with 25 years of contributions. The 
required years of contribution are reduced at higher retirement ages, with a minimum of 
15 years of contribution at 70 years of age. In the savings accounts pillar, individuals 
can start collecting their pension (received as an annuity) either once they are eligible to 
receive a pension from the PAYG pillar or when they have turned 65 years of age. 
Persons who do not satisfy the requirements to access a contributory pension may be 
eligible for a means-tested pension program. 
The old-age pension in the PAYG pillar is computed multiplying the individual's 
average pension wage by the replacement rate. The average pension wage is the average 
of the indexed largest twenty years of wages covered by the PAYG pillar (or the last 
ten, if this is more favorable to the worker, up to a maximum of 1.05 times the best 
twenty). The replacement rate ranges from 45% to 82.5%, depending on the years of 
contribution and the retirement age. In addition, there is an extra bonus for low-income 
workers who choose to contribute to individual savings accounts.  
Two explicit redistributive ingredients in the old-age pension program administered by 
the BPS and the AFAP are the minimum pension and the bonus paid to low income 
workers who explicitly opt to allocate part of their contributions to savings accounts. 
The minimum pension is currently set to about 185 dollars per month. Regarding the 
second mechanism, the PAYG pension of low wage individuals who explicitly opt to 
allocate half of their employee contributions to a savings account is increased by up to 
fifty percent.   
The unemployment insurance program administered by the BPS covers all private 
sector dependent workers but workers in the financial sector, which have a separate 
program. The BPS unemployment insurance program covers three risks: dismissal, 
“suspensión” and reduction of the hours of work. There is a “suspensión” when the firm 
needs to reduce employment temporarily and does not dismiss the “suspended” worker. 
A reduction of 25 percent or more of the hours of work is considered a cause of 
dismissal. Eligibility requires that the separation is not voluntary and that workers do 8 
 
not have other jobs, are willing to accept job offers, must have contributed at least six 
months in the last year, and did not use the program in the previous year. The benefit is 
50 percent of the average wage in the previous six months, with a minimum equal to 
half the minimum wage, plus an additional 20 percent in the case of having dependent 
family. The benefit is paid during six months (Amarante and Bucheli, 2008).  
4  Data 
 
We used a random sample of the work history records of the main social security 
institution of Uruguay (BPS), collected in December 2004 by the Labor History Unit of 
the BPS (ATYR-BPS). Workers in the sample contributed at least one month between 
April 1996 and December 2004. The sample has close to 70,000 individuals.  
This database provides detailed information about monthly contributions to social 
security, wages, and some characteristics of the job, including the date of initiation of 
activity and the explicit end of the link between the worker and the firm. It also has 
personal information of individuals: date of birth, sex and country of birth. A separate 
database contains information about benefits, including the date of retirement.  
The administrative records do not have information about some important socio-
economic characteristics like education and characteristics of the families. Also there is 
no information about other sources of income, including non-declared labor income. 
5  Methodology 
 
The methodology has four parts. First, we estimate the labor status and income models 
and simulated work histories. Second, we compute social security contributions and 
pensions. Third, we compute pre- and post-social security lifetime formal labor income. 
Fourth, we compute the income distribution and redistribution indexes. 
5.1  Labor income and labor status models 
We estimate models for labor income and working-contributing status, using a dynamic 
panel model of income and a linear probability model for the labor status. The two 
models are mostly independent, apart from the inclusion of the individual effects 
estimated in the income equation as regressors in the labor status regression. 
Multiplying formal labor income and the contributing status, we generate the series of 9 
 
work histories on which we base our estimations of labor income distribution and social 
security redistribution.
9  
We estimate and simulate models of formal labor, i.e. labor that is declared to social 
security. This is the relevant concept for the computation of social security benefits, but 
in the presence of high informality, this might be very different from total labor.  
5.1.1  Projection of labor income 
We estimate two labor income models: a dynamic panel data model for the second and 
following months of each spell of contribution and a static model for the first month. 
The dynamic model is as follows: 
it i t it it it it it e v a a dur w w + + + + + + = − δ β β β β ρ 4
2
3 2 1 1 ln ln ln
    
(1) 
Where  it w is the ratio of the nominal wage of individual i at period t respect to the 
nominal wage index of the economy at period t 
10;  it dur is the tenure in the current job; 
it a  stands for age;  t δ  are month dummies; and  i ν is a time invariant unobservable 
characteristic of individual i. The idiosyncratic shock  it e is assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean 0 and variance
2
it σ .  
The individual effects  i ν  are meant to capture the heterogeneity that comes from 
education and ability. Once the model was estimated, the individual effects were 
computed as follows: 
() () ∑
=
− + + + + − =
i T
t
t it it it it it
i






3 2 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ln ˆ ln
1 ˆ δ β β β β ρ
  
(2) 
Predicted values of labor income were calculated as follows: 
i t it it it it it v a a r u ld w w ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ~ ˆ ~ ln ˆ ~ ln 4
2
3 2 1 1 + + + + + = − δ β β β β ρ
    
(3) 
We estimate the following model for the first month of each spell of contribution:  
      ( 4 )  
                                                            
9 The methods used in this study are adapted from Forteza et al. (2009).  
10 This is inspired in Bosworth et al. (1999). 
i i i i i v a a b ε α α α α + + + + = ˆ ln 4
2
3 2 110 
 
Where  i b is the average real wage,  i a is the age and  i νˆ  is the individual effect estimated 
with equation      (1). We use the OLS estimator with the White formula in 
order to obtain the standard errors. Predictions for the first month are thus computed as: 
i i i i v a a b ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ~
ln 4
2
3 2 1 α α α α + + + =
       ( 5 )  
For this prediction,  i νˆ  is estimated from equation (1) while the remaining parameters 
come  from  equation         (4).   
5.1.2  Projection of the contribution status 
We used a fixed effects linear probability model to project the contribution status. 
Besides its simplicity, the linear probability model has the advantage – compared to 
non-linear models –, that the individual effects can be computed. These effects are 
essential for projection purposes, particularly so when the database does not have 
sufficient socio-economic characteristics to capture heterogeneity, as it is the case with 
administrative data.
11 
The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual makes a contribution during a 
particular month and zero otherwise  { } ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ it C . We allowed for two independent 
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Where     is a set of independent regressors,    is the individual effect and     is an 
idiosyncratic shock.  
The individual effects in the contribution status equations are computed as: 
( ) ()
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η .  
Where  () otherwise s C if s C it it 0 ; 1 1 1 = = = Ι − − .  
                                                            
11 For models of contribution status using duration models see Bucheli et al. (2010). 11 
 
The set of variables included as regressors are: (i) age (cubic polynomial); (ii) dummy 
“elderly” that equals 1 if individuals are 60 or older; (iii) dummy “young” that is 1 if 
individuals are 25 or younger; (iv) the rate of unemployment; and (v) the estimated 
individual effects in the labor income equations ( ) i ν ~ . The latter regressor is important as 
it links labor income and contribution status in the simulations. 
We need an additional equation to project the contribution status in the first period. We 
assume that individuals start contributing at 18 and estimate a static contribution-status 
equation at that age: 
it i it it e y C + + = 2 1 ' ˆ ' α η α          ( 7 )  
In this equation we include as regressors: (i) age (square polynomial), (ii) the rate of 
unemployment, and (iii) the individual effects computed in the dynamic equations   ̂ .  
We simulate the contribution status of workers across their lifetime conditional on the 
individual not retiring or passing away. Simulations start at the age of 18. We determine 
the contribution status for the first month using equation          
      (7) and for the following months using equation     
        (6). More specifically we simulate the probability of 
contributing                   1   , draw realizations from a uniform (0,1) distribution 
         and set     as:        1                               0          . In turn, the 
simulated probability of contributing is computed as: 
1 ˆ ' ˆ ˆ '
~
2 1 = + = t if y P i it it α η α  
and: 
2 ; 1
~ ˆ ˆ '
~
2 ; 0
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We compute the percentage of correct predictions in the sample to assess the goodness 
of fit of the models.  
5.2  Computation of SS contributions and benefits 
Using the simulated work histories, we compute social security contributions and 
benefits according to the existing social security norms. We consider two social security 12 
 
programs, old-age pensions and unemployment insurance. Contributions to these two 
programs are bundled together in Uruguay, so we cannot separate their impact on 
inequality. As in most countries, old age pensions are also integrated with disability and 
survivors insurance. Due to the lack of information about family composition and the 
incidence of disability, we focus on old-age pensions, assuming the simulated 
individuals leave no survivors and suffer no disability.  We assume individuals claim 
benefits as soon as they are eligible.  
We also simulate a scenario in which vesting period conditions are not fully enforced. 
In this alternative scenario, individuals who claim and receive pensions without having 
fulfilled the years of contribution legally required are assumed to receive minimum 
pensions. The aim of simulating this weak enforcement scenario is twofold. First, we 
want to assess the impact of vesting period conditions on social security 
progressiveness. Second, this scenario is a stylized representation of actual practices in 
an institutional environment in which the testimony of witnesses to credit contributions 
is still common practice. 
5.3  Computation of pre- and post-social-security lifetime formal income 
The expected pre-social security lifetime formal labor income is the present value of the 
expected simulated formal labor income: 












Where  r is age at retirement,  ( ) a p  is the probability of worker’s survival at age a, 
() a W  is pre-social security formal labor income at age a, andρ is the discount rate. 
Pre-social security formal labor income was computed as income before paying both 
employee and employer contributions. This assumes a perfectly elastic labor demand, 
which is a common assumption for this type of analysis, as contributions eventually 
impact on net wages in the long run (Gruber, 1999, p 90; Brown et al. 2009, p 13; 
Hamermesh and Rees 1993, p 212). 
In a base case scenario, we assume the discount rate is 3 percent per annum (ppa), but 
we also simulate scenarios with 1 and 2 ppa. It has been argued that social security 
lifetime transfers are smaller the higher the discount rate, partly because of the social 
security wealth reduction it involves, but also because most social security programs 13 
 
perform redistribution through benefit rather than contribution formulas. Because of 
this, in their analysis of the redistributive impact of the US social security system, 
Brown et al. (2009) use 2 and 4 ppa. Liebman (2001) uses the internal rate of return of 
the cohort he analyzes -1.29 ppa- in order to focus only on intra-cohort redistribution, 
but he also presents results with higher discount rates.  
We assume that social security does not impact on the age at retirement, so we used the 
same value of r  to compute the pre- and post-social security labor income. We only 
depart from this assumption in the weak enforcement scenario, in which all individuals 
are assumed to retire at the minimum retirement age. Also we assume that the 
interruptions in labor history are exogenously given, independent in particular of the 
unemployment insurance program.  
Lifetime social security wealth is the indicator computed to account for social security 
transfers. It is defined as the sum of the discounted expected flow of old-age pensions
() PB  and unemployment benefits ( ) UB , net of contributions ( ) SSC . 
SSC UB PB SSW − + =  








+ = ∑ ρ 1 ,
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Where  age max  is maximum potential age,  ( ) r a B ,  is the amount of retirement benefits 
at age aconditional on retirement at age r,  ( ) a UB  is the unemployment benefit 
collected at age a, and () a C  is the amount of contribution at age ato social security. 
The formulas used in this study to compute social security wealth are adapted from the 
literature that studies incentives to retire (e.g. Blanchet and Pelé, 1999, p132). Similar 
expressions are used in the literature that analyzes lifetime redistribution in social 
security (e.g. Liebman, 2001). 14 
 
5.4  Computation of income distribution indexes 
As a first step to characterize the redistributive impact of social security, we first present 
some descriptive statistics of lifetime expected pre-social security formal labor income, 
social security wealth and the social security wealth to pre-social security income ratio. 
These indicators do not provide a direct measure of the change in inequality that social 
security brings about, but are only a first assessment of the degree of redistribution  
taking place within the social security system.  
In order to informally assess local progressiveness in social security, we plot individual 
social security wealth versus pre-social security formal labor income. A negative slope 
is a sign of progressiveness. Liebman (2001) presents similar plots for the US. 
We then turn to global measures of progressiveness. We compute the Lorenz curves of 
the expected pre-social security formal labor income and the associated concentration 
curves of the expected post-social security formal labor income (ranked by pre-social 
security income). We also compute the Gini index of the pre- and post-social security 
formal labor income and 95% confidence intervals. 
Finally, we compute the Reynolds-Smolensky  index (RS) of net redistributive effect 
(Lambert, 1993, p 256). This index measures the redistributive impact of a program 
computing the area between the Lorenz pre-program income and the concentration post-
program income. A positive (negative) value indicates that the program reduces 
(increases) inequality.  
The estimation of the Lorenz and concentration curves and of the Gini and RS indexes 
was done using DASP (Araar and Duclos 2009).  
  15 
 
6  Results 
 
6.1  The labor income and contribution status models 
We present the labor income regressions in Table 1. The equations for the second and 
following months of each spell of contributions show, as expected, a highly significant 
autoregressive component, ranging from about 0.5 to almost 0.7. Therefore, there is 
considerable persistence. Duration in the spell of contribution also has a positive impact 
on wages (albeit not statistically significant in the case of women in the private sector) 
and the coefficients multiplying age and age squared are significant at 1% in all cases, 
positive for age and negative for age squared. The labor income plot is thus concave in 
age.  
Labor income in the first month of the spells of contribution does not show the same 
pattern in the four categories. Only in the case of women does initial labor income look 
concave in ages. In the case of men working in the public sector, age does not seem to 
have a significant impact on initial labor income and in the case of men working in the 
private sector, initial labor income appears to be convex in age. In all cases, the 
individual effect computed in the equation for the second and following months enters 
in the equation for the first month with positive and statistically significant coefficients.  
The equations for the contribution status are presented in Table 2. Age enters in the 
regressions for individuals aged 19 and above through a cubic polynomial and two 
dummies. Figure 1 summarizes the age-profiles of the contribution probabilities 
according to the models. In the same figure, we also plot the observed frequencies of 
contribution. The regressions seem to replicate observed frequencies quite well in the 
case of public sector workers, but less so in the case of private sector workers. The rate 
of unemployment exhibits the expected negative sign in some but not all equations. The 
individual effects from the labor income equations     exhibit the expected positive 
sign, significant at 1%, in all cases. This means that individuals who get higher labor 
income when they contribute also have higher probability of contributing. The 
Adjusted-R2 of these equations is very low. Regressions for the contribution status at 
age 18 show higher Adjusted-R2, but some of the results are rather unexpected. Only 
among men in the private sector does the rate of unemployment show the expected 
significant negative coefficient. Also the individual effects from the contribution status 
regressions for age 19 and above show the expected positive sign in the case of public 16 
 
sector workers, but a negative sign among private sector workers. Notwithstanding, the 
goodness of fit as measured by the percentage of correct predictions in within sample 
simulations is satisfactory (Table 3).  
6.2  The redistributive impact of social security 
We present in Table 4 some descriptive statistics of the simulated database. Average 
expected lifetime pre-social security labor income is 175 thousand dollars, ranging from 
110 among women in the private sector to 364 among men in the public sector. On 
average, public sector workers earn more than twice as much as their private 
counterparts.  
The simulated database exhibits much dispersion of income, which is central to 
effectively assess redistribution. There are some simulated individuals with very low 
lifetime income. The percentile one individual (P1) has about 500 dollars in the case of 
women working in the private sector. These women receive small income when they 
work but, more importantly, they have very short histories of contribution. Other 
categories exhibit higher P1 incomes, but even among men in the public sector, which 
exhibits the highest P1 income, it is smaller than 4,500 dollars. In interpreting these 
results, it is important to keep in mind that we are considering only formal lifetime labor 
income. We have no information about other sources of income, so we did not model or 
simulate income individuals may obtain in the informal sector. At the other end of the 
distribution, the percentile 99 individuals (P99) range from about 750 to almost 1,600 
thousand dollars. As expected, the distributions are skewed to the right, with median 
consistently lower than mean income. 
Average social security wealth ranges from minus 18 thousand dollars among men in 
the public sector to 2.3 thousand dollars among women in the private sector. Measured 
by the difference between percentiles 1 and 99 within each category, social security 
wealth exhibits the highest dispersion among men in the public sector (96 thousand 
dollars) and the lowest among women in the private sector (65 thousand dollars). The 
minimum P1 is minus 86 thousand dollars and takes place among men in the public 
sector. The maximum P99 is almost 20 thousand dollars and takes place among women 
in the private sector.  17 
 
The individual social security wealth to income ratio is on average 8%.
12 The lowest 
average is -3% among men in the public sector and the highest is 19% among women in 
the private sector. There is much dispersion in this ratio, as the percentile one individual 
(ranked by the ratio) losses 13% and the percentile 99 gains almost 150% of their 
lifetime declared income.  
According to these results, social security performs much redistribution. Whether this 
redistribution reduces inequality depends on how these transfers are correlated to 
lifetime income. We turn now to this point. 
Figure 2 plots social security wealth and pre social security lifetime formal labor 
income. To facilitate comparisons between categories, we limit income in the figure to 
the minimum P1 to the maximum P99 range. The negative slope of the plots suggests 
that social security is progressive. However, there is considerable dispersion of social 
security wealth for each income level. Liebman (2001) reports a similar finding for the 
US.  
The concentration curve of post-social security formal income is closer to the 45° line 
than the Lorenz curve of pre-social security formal income, showing that social security 
reduces inequality (Figure 3). 
The Gini coefficient of the simulated pre social security life time formal labor income is 
0.60 for the total population (Table 5). According to this indicator, the distribution of 
the income measure considered in the present study is much more unequal than the 
distribution of current household per capita income reported to household surveys.
13 In 
addition, inequality is much higher among private than public sector workers. The Gini 
of lifetime income is in the order of 0.6 among private and 0.4 among public sector 
workers. 
                                                            
12 Liebman (2001) computed the same indicator for the United States. Using a discount rate of 3 percent 
per annum -the same rate used in the present study-, he finds the average ratio to be -6.6%.  
13 CEDLAS and The World Bank (April 2011), for example, report Gini coefficients estimated on 2009 
household per capita income of 0.44. These indicators are not directly comparable to ours though. The 
Ginis reported in the present study refer to individual income as opposed to household per capita income, 
to labor as opposed to total income, to formal (in the sense of reported to social security) as opposed to 
formal plus informal income, and to simulated expected lifetime as opposed to reported current income. 18 
 
According to these simulations, social security reduces inequality in Uruguay, causing a 
1.8 percentage points drop in the Gini coefficient of expected life time formal labor 
income (Table 5). The RS index of net progressiveness is 1.9, significant at the usual 
significance levels (Table 6). Inequality falls in the four categories, but it is among 
women in the private sector that we obtain the largest fall, reaching 3 percentage points.  
6.3  Weak enforcement and non-contributory old age pensions 
We consider two extensions of the basic simulation scenario in this section. The first 
consists of simulating a scenario of weak enforcement, i.e. a scenario in which pension 
eligibility conditions are not fully enforced. The second is a scenario in which we 
incorporate non-contributory old age pensions. 
6.3.1  Weak enforcement 
There is considerable evidence that the administration does not fully enforce the 
eligibility conditions to access to contributory old-age pensions in the social security 
system administered by the BPS. Forteza (2003) reports anecdotal but also some 
normative evidence that suggests that the testimony of witnesses to certify that 
individuals claiming pensions fulfill the vesting period conditions is common practice. 
This anomaly is possible because of the failure of the administration to keep records of 
contributions. In turn,  Bucheli et al. (2010) and Forteza et al. (2009) show that large 
segments of the population have a low probability of having contributed the number of 
years required to access to contributory pensions. These results contradict the high 
coverage that this program has among the elderly according to household surveys. One 
possibility, of course, is that the estimated probabilities are wrong, but the existing 
evidence on the contribution densities is in line with those estimations, suggesting that 
many individuals are receiving old-age contributory pensions without having actually 
fulfilled the vesting period conditions. In so far as short histories of contribution seem to 
be particularly frequent among low income individuals (Bucheli et al. 2010), the de 
facto loosening of the access conditions is likely to raise the progressivity of the social 
security system.  
In order to assess the potential impact of this practice on inequality, we simulate a weak 
enforcement scenario. In this scenario, the vesting period condition is not required in 
practice. The assumption is that everybody can claim an ordinary pension at the 
minimum retirement age (60 years old). Individuals who did not contribute thirty or 19 
 
more years at that age receive the minimum pension. The results of this scenario are 
summarized in Table 7 to 9. 
As expected, social security looks more progressive in the weak than in the strict 
enforcement scenario. Social security causes a 2.6 points fall in the Gini coefficient in 
the weak against 1.8 in the strict enforcement scenario. The RS is now 2.63 percentage 
points.  
6.3.2  Non-contributory old-age pensions 
In this scenario, we add non-contributory to the contributory old age pensions. We 
consider this scenario to make our results more comparable to the results reported by 
Fajnzylber (2011) for the Chilean case. As already mentioned, the present and 
Fajnzylber’s paper are part of a joint effort to assess the redistributive impact of social 
security in Latin America. In Chile, after the 2008 reform, the non-contributory program 
is fully integrated to the contributory individual savings accounts program. Because of 
this, Fajnzylber’s analysis integrates the non-contributory and contributory components 
in his assessment of redistribution in the Chilean pension system.   
We did not compute taxes individuals pay to finance non-contributory pensions, so our 
analysis regarding the redistributive impact of non-contributory pensions is closer to an 
expenditure incidence analysis than to the net-fiscal-system type of analysis we did for 
the contributory program (Lambert, 1993).
14  
Unlike in the previous subsection, we assume again that the social security norms are 
strictly enforced. Individuals are eligible to receive the non-contributory pension 
(Pensión por Vejez) at age 70, provided they did not reach before the necessary number 
of contributions to retire and receive a contributory pension.  We assume that 
individuals retiring through this program will receive the minimum pension. Summary 
results are presented in Table 10.  
As expected, social security looks more progressive when non-contributory pensions are 
included. There is a fall in the Gini coefficient of 3.1 points compared to the 1.8 fall we 
                                                            
14 In the real world, when the contributory program is partially financed by the government from the 
general budget, the distinction between contributory and non-contributory programs is more blurred than 
what the definitions suggest. This is the case of the program administered by the BPS. We made no 
attempt to compute taxes individuals pay to finance the contributory pensions program.   20 
 
obtain when only contributory pensions are included. The RS is now 3.1 percentage 
points. 
6.3.3  Other scenarios 
We also run scenarios with lower discount rates. Using 1 and 2 ppa rather than the 3 ppa 
discount rate used in the base case scenario, we got more redistribution and more 
reduction of inequality. The general picture, however, does not change much.
15  
7  Concluding Remarks 
The Uruguayan social security system redistributes income on a lifetime basis. The net 
effect of this redistribution is a reduction in inequality: the Gini coefficient of simulated 
post-social security lifetime formal labor income is about 1.8 percentage points lower 
than of pre-social security income. Social security looks more redistributive when non-
contributive pensions are included: the Gini falls by about 3.1 percentage points when 
this program is included in the simulations. Also the program could be considerably 
more progressive than what the base-case scenario suggests because of the de facto 
loosening of the eligibility conditions. We get a 2.6 fall in the Gini coefficient due to 
social security when we assume that all individuals who have contributed less than 30 
years receive the minimum pension when they turn 60.  
The impact of the Uruguayan social security system on inequality is similar to the 
Brazilian (Zylberstajn 2011), but smaller than the Chilean. Using a similar 
methodology, Fajnzylber (2011) reports a four point drop in the Gini coefficient of life 
time income due to social security in Chile. The dispersion of social security wealth that 
can be observed at each level of life time income suggests that much redistribution in 
the Uruguayan program fails to reducing inequality. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Labor income regressions 
A) Equation (1): it i t it it it it it e v a a dur w w + + + + + + = − δ β β β ρ
2




Private Sector  Public Sector  Private Sector Public  Sector 
    0.647*** 0.513*** 0.682*** 0.562*** 
Log of Duration  1.123***  3.604***  0.0494  3.210*** 
Age  0.065*** 0.208*** 0.019*** 0.178*** 
Age
2  -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.003*** -0.016*** 
Constant  0.872*** 1.063*** 0.702*** 0.845*** 
Nº of Observations  1522832  389724  1137006  414016 
Nº of Individuals  30625  4967  23930  5187 
R-squared  0.509 0.38 0.546  0.413 
Standard Deviation of    0.332 0.337 0.353 0.282 
Standard Deviation of    0.292 0.277 0.268 0.280 
 
Note: * significant at 10%,  ** significant at 5%,  *** significant at 1%. wit is the ratio of the nominal wage 
of individual i at period t respect to the nominal wage index of the economy at period t. Duration is divided 
by 100. Age is measured in years and is divided by 10. Age
2 is divided by 100. Monthly dummies were 
included.  * significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. 
Source:  Authors’ computations. 
B) Equation (2):    
Independent Variables 
Men Women 
Private Sector  Public Sector  Private Sector Public  Sector 
    0.886***     1.621***  1.394***  1.721*** 
Age -0.227***  -0.072  0.087***  0.462*** 
Age
2 0.015***  0.013  -0.013***  -0.045*** 
Constant  2.806***      3.102***  2.342***  2.161*** 
Nº of Observations  38,086  1,184  22,050  1,805 
R-squared 0.051  0.199  0.31  0.327 
Note: * significant at 10%,  ** significant at 5%,  *** significant at 1%.  bi is the average of the nominal 
wage of individual i at period t relative to the average wage index of the economy in the first 12 months of 
the contribution spell.  Age is measured in years and is divided by 10.  Age
2 is divided by 100.  is the 
individual effect computed in equation (1). 
Source:  Authors’ computations. 
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Table 2: Contribution Status 
A) Equation(1):   1 ' ; 0 ' 1
1 1 1
1
0 0 0 = + + = = + + = − − it it i it it it it i it it C if x C C if x C ε η β ε η β .  
Age 19 and above. 
Independent Variables 
Men 
Private Sector  Public Sector 
Previous period status  Previous period status 
Contribute Not  Contribute  Contribute Not  Contribute 
Age 0.0030***  0.0003***  0.0019***  0.0011*** 
Age
2 -5.4702***  -0.6942***  -3.2270***  -2.2170*** 
Age
3 0.3270***  0.0394***  0.1810***  0.1291*** 
Elderly -0.0219***  -0.0089***  -0.0105***  -0.0173*** 
Young 0.0218***  0.0014  0.0042***  -0.0006 
Unemployment -0.0001***  -0.0041***  0.0002***  -0.0017*** 
   0.0171***  0.0125***  0.0105***  0.0073*** 
Constant 0.4449***  0.0696***  0.6425***  -0.1055*** 
Nº of Observations  1804203  1067089  406957  52446 
R-squared 0.013  0.004  0.016  0.006 
Independent Variables 
Women 
Private Sector  Public Sector 
Previous period status  Previous period status 
Contribute Not  Contribute  Contribute Not  Contribute 
Age 0.0037***  -0.0001*  0.0035***  0.0022*** 
Age
2 -6.9370***  0.1790*  -6.4188***  -4.0546*** 
Age
3 0.4226***  -0.0134*  0.3880***  0.2313*** 
Elderly -0.0322***  -0.0013  -0.0266***  -0.0119 
Young 0.0256***  0.0040***  0.0122***  0.0169*** 
Unemployment 0.0007***  -0.0026***  0.0003***  0.0015*** 
  0.0113*** 0.0106***  0.0139***  0.0132*** 
Constant 0.3286***  0.0872***  0.3880***  -0.3312*** 
Nº of Observations  1313013  979173  434479  67814 
Adjusted R-squared  0.016  0.003  0.024  0.006 
Note:  * significant at 10%,  ** significant at 5%,  *** significant at 1%.  Age is measured in months.  Age
2 
is divided by 1,000,000 and Age
3 is divided by 100,000,000.   Elderly is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
individual is 60 years or older. Young is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is 25 years or younger. 
Unemployment is the country’s unemployment rate.   is the individual effect computed in the wage 
equation (see Equation (1)).  










Private Sector  Public Sector  Private Sector  Public Sector 
 Age  0.5544***  0.6166**  0.3326***  0.1013 
Age
2 -1.2156***  -1.3736**  -0.7183***  -0.2158 
Unemployment  -0.0067*** 0.0025  -0.0002 0.0076*** 
η̂  -0.0563*** 0.0554*** -0.0268*** 0.0363*** 
Nº of Observations  38,086 1,184 22,050 1,805 
R-squared 0.051  0.199  0.31  0.327 
Note: * significant at 10%,  ** significant at 5%,  *** significant at 1. Age is measured in months.  Age
2 is 
divided by 100.  η̂ are the individual effects computed in the contribution status equations for age 19 and 
above. 
Source:  Authors’ computations. 
Table 3: Goodness of fit  
  Percentage of Correct Predictions for... 
  
  Men private sector  90.9  93.9 
  Men public sector  93.2  98.9 
 Women  private  sector  94.6  95.4 
  Women public sector  92.4  98.6 
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Table 4: Pre- social security lifetime formal labor income and social security wealth (in thousands of 2010 US 
dollars) 
      mean  sd  p1  p50  p99 
Men Private 
Life time income  152.95 303.09  2.19  81.63 1271.99 
SSW  -3.97 14.54  -77.92 -0.94 12.88 
SSW/income 0.04 0.19  -0.12  -0.02  0.71 
Men Public 
Life time income  363.98 326.38  6.46  278.04  1597.50 
SSW  -17.98 23.44 -86.29 -7.01  9.32 
SSW/income -0.03 0.06 -0.08 -0.03 0.18 
Women Private 
Life time income  109.39 319.04  0.51  54.01  764.57 
SSW  1.22 10.13  -46.14 0.56 19.09 
SSW/income 0.19 0.61 -0.14 0.02 2.65 
Women Public 
Life time income  291.51 237.82  6.25  239.50  1165.97 
SSW  -3.58 16.25  -66.45 1.47 15.90 
SSW/income 0.02 0.10 -0.06 0.01 0.43 
TOTAL 
Life time income  175.11 333.70  1.30  89.28 1211.41 
SSW  -3.62 15.71  -77.32 -0.23 17.06 
SSW/income 0.08 0.39  -0.13  -0.01  1.47 
Source:  Authors’ computations. 
Table 5: Gini coefficients of life time labor income before and after social security 
     




Lower bound (95%) 
0.570 0.552 





Lower bound (95%) 
0.422 0.411 





Lower bound (95%) 
0.597 0.566 





Lower bound (95%) 
0.399 0.383 





Lower bound (95%) 
0.589 0.570 
Upper bound (95%) 
0.619 0.594 
Source:  Authors’ computations. 
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Table 6: Indexes of redistribution 
   Reynolds Smolensky Standard  Deviation 
Men private  0.0175  0.0007 
Men public  0.0109  0.0002 
Women private  0.0310  0.0011 
Women public  0.0158  0.0002 
Total 0.0188  0.0004 
Source:  Authors’ computations. 
Table 7: Pre social security lifetime formal labor income and social security wealth under weak enforcement of 
pension eligibility conditions (in thousands of 2010 US dollars). a/ 
      mean  sd  p1  p50  p99 
Men Private 
Life time income  151.92 303.18  2.06  81.08 1266.49 
SSW  -3.73 15.40  -82.62 -0.49  9.02 
SSW/income  0.23 3.07 -0.09  -0.01 2.76 
Men Public 
Life time income  362.96 327.05  4.42  277.22  1597.50 
SSW  -18.49 24.05 -89.60 -7.51  8.05 
SSW/income  0.00 0.24 -0.09  -0.03 0.89 
Women Private 
Life time income  107.81 318.80  0.51  52.31  754.76 
SSW  2.25 10.34  -47.37 4.49 11.52 
SSW/income  0.64 2.77 -0.10 0.07 8.51 
Women Public 
Life time income  289.68 239.51  0.00  238.51  1165.97 
SSW  -4.05 16.57  -67.40 1.27 12.47 
SSW/income  0.10 0.94 -0.07 0.01 1.84 
TOTAL 
Life time income  173.76 333.83  0.76  87.76 1211.41 
SSW  -3.29 16.45  -80.09 0.77 11.07 
SSW/income  0.34 2.68 -0.09 0.01 5.05 
/ In this scenario, we dropped the vesting period conditions to access pensions. See text for the details.  
Source: Authors’ computations 
Table 8: Gini coefficients of life time labor income before and after social security under weak enforcement of 
pension eligibility conditions. a/ 
      Gini before SS  Gini after SS  
Men private 
Estimate  0.593 0.567 
Lower bound (95%)  0.575 0.548 
Upper bound (95%)  0.611 0.589 
Men public 
Estimate  0.434 0.422 
Lower bound (95%)  0.425 0.413 
Upper bound (95%)  0.443 0.431 
Women private 
Estimate  0.632 0.583 
Lower bound (95%)  0.605 0.553 
Upper bound (95%)  0.659 0.613 
Women public 
Estimate  0.414 0.398 
Lower bound (95%)  0.406 0.390 
Upper bound (95%)  0.423 0.407 
Total 
Estimate  0.606 0.580 
Lower bound (95%)  0.594 0.568 
Upper bound (95%)  0.617 0.592 
Source:  Authors’ computations. 
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Table 9: Indexes of redistribution under weak enforcement of pension eligibility conditions a/ 
   Reynolds Smolensky Standard  Deviation 
Men private  0.0258  0.0008 
Men public  0.0117  0.0002 
Women private  0.0491  0.0018 
Women public  0.0160  0.0002 
Total 0.0263  0.0006 
Source:  Authors’ computations. 
Table 10: Gini and Reynolds-Smolensky indexes when non-contributory pensions are included in the 
simulation  
   Gini before SS  Gini after SS   Reynolds Smolensky 
Men  private  0.590 0.561 0.029 
Men  public  0.433 0.420 0.013 
Women  private  0.627 0.568 0.060 
Women  public  0.413 0.394 0.019 
Total  0.603 0.572 0.031 
Source:  Authors’ computations. 
Figures 
Figure 1: Observed and Simulated Contribution Densities by Age 
 













































































































































Figure 3: Pre Social Security lifetime formal income Lorenz curve and post Social Security lifetime formal 
income concentration curve  
 
Source:  Authors’ computations. 
 
Source:  Authors’ computations. 
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Figure 4: Social security wealth and life time income under weak enforcement of pension eligibility conditions 
(thousands of USD of Jan 2010) a/ 
 
Source:  Authors’ computations. 
    
Source:  Authors’ computations. 



















































































Figure 5: Pre Social Security lifetime formal income Lorenz curve and post Social Security lifetime formal 
income concentration curve under weak enforcement of pension eligibility conditions 
 
Source:  Authors’ computations. 
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